Research

Please email jisooseo@buffalo.edu for drafts.

Philosophy of Science

1. A new metaphysical picture of natural kinds

(Forthcoming in Philosophy of Science)

In this paper, I suggest a positive metaphysical account of natural kinds that would supplement the stable property cluster view (SPC) envisioned by Matthew Slater in his 2015 work. The two kinds of worries against SPC, namely the lack of causality between properties and the lack of metaphysical assumption, are assuaged by the metaphysical picture I provide for SPC. The metaphysical picture outlines a causal relation R that represents the probability of coinstantiation between two properties, suggesting a theory of network that is similar, but not identical to Muhammad Ali Khalidi's natural kinds as causal network theory. (Khalidi 2018) My theory includes both metaphysical and epistemic grounds for the stability of natural kinds that will respond to the criticism against SPC but at the same time, promote the merits of SPC by allowing for flexibility.

2. Race as a stable property cluster (SPC) kind

In this paper, I demonstrate that the Stable Property Cluster (SPC) view best represents the perplexing nature of race. The SPC view is particularly suited for the metaphysics of race due to its ability to accommodate the blurriness and ambiguity that characterize racial categories. Unlike theories of natural kind that insist on rigid, essential characteristics for race, the SPC view acknowledges that the properties associated with racial groups are not uniform or fixed but can form clusters that are stable yet not entirely inflexible. Furthermore, the view is proficient in handling the cross-cutting and overlapping components within and between racial groups. From an ethical standpoint, the SPC perspective avoids the pitfalls of racial essentialism, which can lead to stereotyping and discrimination. Understanding race as a cluster of stable properties that are grounded by human interests rather than a fixed essence or causal mechanisms promotes a more nuanced and ethical approach to racial categorization.

Science and Values

3. A consequentialist way of looking at values in science

In this paper, I argue that evaluations of scientific knowledge should be determined by the social consequences that would be brought about rather than the different ways non-epistemic values play roles. This is because, first, models that focus on the way that values affect scientific knowledge are ineffective and construed on a misleading categorization of values. Second, I will show that scientific knowledge cannot be clearly severed away from social knowledge and may share an important nature with it. Thus we cannot expect only epistemic values to be the appropriate standard in assessing the quality and value of scientific knowledge. If this is the case, scientific knowledge can be assessed in terms of non-epistemic values by anticipating the social consequences of scientific knowledge.

Applied Ontology

4. How to represent race as social/biological kinds in BFO

Can human races be represented as social and biological kinds within the standards of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)? In this paper, I aim to give a positive response to this question under the condition of following the considerations and guidelines suggested by Seppälä, Ruttenberg & Smith (2017), Jansen (forthcoming), and Smith (2004). Also, I critically evaluate an existing ontology on culture, race, ethnicity, and nationality (CRENO) that attempts to represent race in BFO.

5. Race in ontologies: biological racial realism and biomedical ontologies

Ethics of Algorithms

6. Ethics of algorithm: in the case of Prediction Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP)

Numerous medical algorithms assist physicians in making various decisions. One such tool is the opioid addiction scoring system called Prediction Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP). However, Pozzi (2023) accuses PDMP of exacerbating the existing systemic oppression of marginalized groups. The primary goal of this paper is to critically evaluate Pozzi (2023) in her analysis of hermeneutical injustice (HI) in the case of Prediction Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) by posing and navigating the question “Is the PDMP case a standard case of HI?” The secondary goal is to abstract some features of machine learning (ML)-induced injustice and compare them with the features of human-centric injustice. In this paper, I argue that the PDMP case is not a standard case of HI. Though there are some takeaways, there also are some limitations in Pozzi’s (2023) approach to analyzing the HI in PDMP cases. It is not prudent to simply apply HI in the original form that Fricker (2007) offers because there are some differences between the paradigmatic, human-centric cases that Fricker is describing and the cases that involve machine learning algorithms as stakeholders in medical decision-making. And the differences are not as simple as Pozzi makes them to be.

Metaphysics

7. A critical evaluation of Armstrong’s non-mereological composition of states of affairs

Armstrong, in his book A World of State of Affairs (1997), argues that a state of affairs(SOA) is the sum of particulars and universals. Moreover, it is a special kind of composition, namely, "non-mereological composition". The reason behind this is that SOAs seem to disobey the extensionality rule, a key axiom of mereological composition; it appears that two different SOAs are composed of the same components. In this paper, I critically evaluate Armstrong's account of SOAs being non-mereological compositions. First of all, I present a counterexample in which the SOA in question cannot be a non-mereological sum. Second, I show that states of affairs indeed obey the extensionality rule by analyzing an example given by Armstrong. Then, I analyze the reason why SOAs “seem” to disobey the extensionality rule. The confusion was caused by Armstrong’s own way of formalizing SOAs. Also, I try to give an account as to why such illusiveness occurs. In the conclusion of the paper, I argue that Armstrong’ argument that SOAs are non-mereological compositions leads to a dilemma that is detrimental.

8. Against modest alethic pluralism: Substantiveness of Lynch’s ‘Truth as Immanent’

In this paper, I will talk about substantiveness as naturalness and how it should be determined in various truth properties. Especially, I’d like to do so by examining the substantiveness of Lynch’s account of truth property. In his article “Three questions for truth pluralism”, Lynch makes it a fundamental difference between pluralist truth and deflationary truth that the latter lacks the substantiveness that the former has. Deflationary view holds that truth is not an ‘interesting’ property and a mere expressive device whereas Lynch’s account of truth, in Lynch’s view, is a property of real kind that plays actual roles. Under Lynch’s functionalist analysis, “[deflationary] truth’s nature is exhausted by its functions” – in other words, deflationary truth is metaphysically transparent. Lynch, as an inflationist, believes his truth property is metaphysically opaque. However, I’m going to show that his functionalist account of truth property, or ‘truth as an immanent property’ cannot have substantiveness in opacity conception. My main intention in this paper is to discuss different conceptions of substantivenss and investigate the difference between Lynch’s functionalist truth and deflationary truth.

9. Solving the unity problem for natural kinds (working title)

The goal of this paper is to suggest an answer to the question of what maintains the identity of a property cluster natural kind whose members and membership constantly change. This question has been asked by Peter Unger (1980) and dubbed as “the problem of the many” which was developed by David Oderberg (2011) called “the unity problem.” I suggest that natural kindness is what guarantees the identity of a property cluster kind. It can be understood in terms of a disposition with dispositional characters. These dispositional characters are counterfactual profiles of the disposition. The counterfactual profiles correspond to the counterfactual perturbations that stabilize the property cluster kinds. At the core of the counterfactual perturbations is the pragmatic encroachment.